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# MAGTF Rear Area Security

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**U.S. Marine Corps**

MCCDC (C 42)  
27 Nov 2002

E R R A T U M

to

MCRP 3-41.1A

MAGTF REAR AREA SECURITY

1. For administrative purposes, FMFM 2-6 is reidentified as MCRP 3-41.1A.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
Headquarters United States Marine Corps  
Washington, DC 20380-0001

20 May 1991

FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 2-6, *MAGTF Rear Area Security*, explains the doctrinal and Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) organizational basis for security of the rear area.

2. SCOPE

This manual sets forth the doctrinal foundation for rear area security. It completes and amplifies other publications in which rear area security is a factor.

3. SUPERSESION

OH 2-6, *Rear Area Security*.

4. CHANGES

Recommendations for improvements to this manual are encouraged from commands as well as from individuals. Forward suggestions using the User Suggestion Form format to—

Commanding General  
Doctrine Division (C 42)  
Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
2042 Broadway Street Suite 210  
Quantico, VA 22134-5021

5. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS



M. P. CAULFIELD  
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps  
Deputy Commander for Warfighting  
Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
Quantico, Virginia

## User Suggestion Form

From:

To: Commanding General, Doctrine Division (C 42), Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2042 Broadway Street Suite 210, Quantico, Virginia 22134-5021

Subj: RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING FMFM 2-6, *MAGTF REAR AREA SECURITY*

1. In accordance with the foreword to FMFM 2-6, which invites individuals to submit suggestions concerning this FMFM directly to the above addressee, the following unclassified recommendation is forwarded:

<u>Page</u>	<u>Article/Paragraph No.</u>	<u>Line No.</u>	<u>Figure/Table No.</u>
Nature of Change:	<input type="checkbox"/> Add		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Delete		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Change		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Correct		

2. Proposed new verbatim text: (Verbatim, double-spaced; continue on additional pages as necessary.)

3. Justification/source: (Need not be double-spaced.)

Note: Only one recommendation per page.

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# MAGTF Rear Area Security

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1001. General

Modern forces rely on complex weapons and equipment which usually require large sophisticated support organizations. Any major disruption in the functions of friendly rear area support will adversely affect combat operations—not only in today's battle but in tomorrow's battle. The key to success on the battlefield lies in the generation of combat power. If organizations such as the combat service support element (CSSE) or the aviation combat element (ACE) cannot adequately defend themselves, then combat power will be degraded and this will contribute to defeat.

Throughout the spectrum of conflict, rear support areas have increasingly become major targets. Tactical and technological developments have made rear areas extremely vulnerable. Enemy surveillance devices can locate and identify targets deep behind the forward edge of the battle area; accurate, long-range weapons can strike point targets or saturate large areas; aircraft provide rapid transport for troops; and motorized and armored vehicles greatly enhance enemy mobility and flexibility. To protect rear support areas, rear area security must counteract the effects of these sophisticated weapons systems.

### 1002. Rear Area Security Definition and Objective

Rear area security (RAS) includes measures taken prior to, during, and/or after an enemy airborne attack, sabotage, infiltration, guerrilla action, and/or initiation of psychological or propaganda warfare to minimize the effects thereof. The MAGTF rear area is defined as that area extending

rearward from the rear boundary of the ground combat element (GCE) to the MAGTF rear boundary.

The objective of RAS is to provide for the defense of all forces operating within the MAGTF rear area so that those functions associated with rear area operations may continue in an uninterrupted manner with minimum degradation to combat operations. In order to accomplish this objective, all units in the rear area must be prepared to defend themselves.

### 1003. MAGTF Commander's Role

The MAGTF commander is responsible for the security of the MAGTF rear area. The keys to credible MAGTF RAS are sound planning, early warning, continuous operations security, tactical deception, proper dispersion, cover and concealment, and rapid deployment of sufficient forces and resources to counter the threat. Rear area security for the MAGTF must be assessed by the MAGTF commander to ensure the sustainability of combat forces. The MAGTF commander then sets missions, tasks, and priorities for RAS as in any other type of operation. He may delegate the authority for the planning and execution of the RAS effort to that subordinate unit commander best located, organized, and equipped to accomplish the RAS mission. This task could be assigned to the CSSE commander or the ACE commander. However, the task is normally not assigned to the GCE commander unless the GCE's mission is diverted to the rear area. Usually, the CSSE commander will coordinate RAS because the preponderance of forces and activities are within his sphere of influence.

## 1004. Fundamentals of Rear Area Security

The fundamentals of RAS are as follows:

a. *RAS is a MAGTF responsibility.* As previously mentioned, security of the MAGTF rear area is the responsibility of the MAGTF commander. He may delegate authority to coordinate the RAS mission to the CSSE commander or the ACE commander, or both. The MAGTF commander may also divide the rear area into several smaller areas of responsibility. He then will task different subordinate elements with providing security for each area of responsibility. The MAGTF staff, which is capable of planning, monitoring, and coordinating air-ground tactical operations and logistics, keeps the commander informed of the situation in the rear area.

b. *Units are responsible for their own local security.* Unit security is an inherent responsibility for any commander. The fact that a higher commander establishes security measures does not relieve a unit commander of this responsibility. Rear area units must plan for and be able to execute active and passive security measures for local security and the rear area as a whole.

### (1) Active measures:

- Training Marines in basic infantry skills to include antiarmor and air defense.
- Organizing units for defensive operations.
- Equipping support elements with weapons and munitions required for local defense.
- Patrolling, establishing observation/listening posts, and using other local security techniques.
- Providing security to convoys.
- Positioning low altitude air defense units in depth within the objective area.
- Establishing liaison with fire support organizations and training in call-for-fire procedures.

- Establishing and coordinating security and security reaction forces both within units and within geographical areas.
- Employing close air support and close-in fire support.
- Establishing defensive plans and positions to include local barriers and obstacles.

### (2) Passive measures:

- Using camouflage, dispersion, and natural cover.
- Hardening installations.
- Establishing deception measures such as dummy installations and positions.
- Positioning rear area units to be mutually supporting.
- Establishing redundant facilities to preclude MAGTF support capabilities from being rendered ineffective should the primary facility be destroyed.

c. *The RAS effort places minimum reliance on the GCE.* GCE assets should be tasked with security missions in the MAGTF rear area only in emergencies and only to the minimum extent necessary. This allows the GCE commander to focus on the GCE mission which would normally be the main battle. GCE units should be diverted to MAGTF RAS missions only when large enemy ground formations are attacking support and aviation elements and the accomplishment of the MAGTF mission has become jeopardized. (When such major penetrations occur in the MAGTF rear area, the problem becomes more than just RAS and requires a realignment of the main battle.)

d. *The RAS effort is proportionate to the threat.* RAS must be a phased response in direct proportion to threat capabilities. This requires accurate threat assessment. The degree of security provided must be sufficient to ensure that rear area

operations continue with minimum disruption. The RAS plan must not be so demanding or restrictive on rear area units that it renders their functioning ineffective. When the threat increases, RAS may require reinforcement and reorganization of rear area units to include task-organized reaction forces. In a high threat situation, the MAGTF commander may direct the GCE commander to increase the size of reserve forces to provide adequate response to counter the threat.

### 1005. Rear Area Security Planning

a. Efficient RAS planning and execution require effective and timely command and control. Coordination for fire support, air defense, close air support, close-in fire support, and use of intelligence assets must be established. Prior coordination with the ACE and GCE will facilitate implementation of air and fire support missions. In planning for RAS, units must make provisions for equipping, staffing, and training to ensure that both active and passive security measures can be implemented in a timely manner.

b. The MAGTF commander must clearly define the roles of the GCE, ACE, and CSSE in the RAS effort, to include which element will be designated the overall coordinator for RAS during an operation. The MAGTF commander must also specify responsibility for completing the following RAS tasks:

- (1) Defense of CSSE and ACE facilities.
- (2) Security of main supply routes (MSRs) and lines of communications (LOCs).
- (3) Security of areas outside CSSE and ACE facilities and areas away from MSRs/LOCs.
- (4) Air defense.
- (5) Coordination and provision of rear area fire support.

c. Rear area units should anticipate enemy intentions based upon the threat assessment and should plan RAS contingencies accordingly. Small enemy units will probably be able to infiltrate the MAGTF rear area, inflicting damage and causing losses. RAS planning should include the creation of redundant facilities, the hardening of those facilities, and the protection of activities (including convoys) so that no one capability, facility, or activity can be destroyed in one enemy attack. A strong rear area defensive posture forces the enemy to infiltrate and mass large forces in order to attack successfully. Larger enemy forces are easier to locate, fix, and destroy. Implied in the RAS mission is the use of RAS security forces to cover remote areas so that the enemy cannot assemble his forces. This robs the enemy of security, the ability to mass, freedom of movement, and surprise. It is important to note that threats against the MAGTF rear area would probably evolve over a course of 6 to 12 hours, if not days. Proper utilization of intelligence assets can preclude rear area units from being surprised, as well as assist the RAS coordinator in the formulation of the RAS effort.

d. RAS planning should also consider that RAS forces should be capable of finding, fixing (depriving the enemy of freedom of movement), and destroying an enemy unit. The size of the enemy unit that the RAS security forces should be capable of destroying will depend on the size and task organization of the MAGTF. A MEF RAS force should be able to destroy a company-sized unit (100-150) without GCE assistance, and be capable of finding and fixing an enemy battalion-sized unit (500-600) while awaiting GCE assistance. Each MAGTF will have to evaluate these two requirements and determine their capability based on task organization.

### 1006. Rear Area Security Command and Control

a. The rear area security coordinator (RASC) will have coordinating authority over all elements in

the MAGTF rear area. Normally, the CSSE commander will be the RASC. The CSSE commander, as the RASC, monitors the day-to-day operations of the CSSE and the MAGTF rear area through the combat service support operations center (CSSOC) and the rear area operations center (RAOC). The CSSE G-3 is responsible for the operation of the CSSOC. The CSSOC is functional 24 hours a day during combat operations and continually monitors and records the status of CSS operations. The CSSOC is staffed by the CSSE's operations and communications personnel. Local standing operating procedures (SOP) govern the size and composition of the CSSOC.

b. An RAOC will be established within the CSSOC to assist the RASC in the RAS effort. The RAOC is task-organized to direct and control the RAS effort. The RAOC is supervised by the tactical security officer (TSO) who is normally assigned from the tactical readiness and training section of the G-3. The TSO can be assisted by a fire support coordinator, an air liaison officer, and a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) representative. At the Marine Expeditionary Force level, the RAOC could resemble the following:

BILLET	GRADE	MOS
Tactical Security Officer	Col	9904
Asst Tactical Security Officer	Maj	0302
Section Chief	MSgt	0369
Admin Clerk/Driver	Cpl	0431
Fire Support Coordinator	Maj	0802
FSC Chief	GySgt	0848
Air Liaison Officer	Capt	9912
NBC Representative	WO	5702

Figure 1-1 depicts a notional CSSOC using three adjoining and interconnected general purpose tents. The key to effective coordination of all elements is the duty watch officer who continually moves about the CSSOC ensuring information flow among the key players.




Figure 1-1. Notional CSSOC.

c. Should the ACE be geographically separated from the GCE and the CSSE, the ACE commander would then be responsible for coordinating RAS for organic assets. The Marine aircraft wing (MAW) has four Marine wing support squadrons (MWSSs), each capable of conducting independent airbase operations in support of a Marine aircraft group (MAG). When two or more airbases are functioning individually, each commanding officer of each MWSS will be assigned as the TSO officer for that respective airbase. The airbase TSO is responsible to the airbase commander for the coordination of RAS. Each airbase TSO will task-organize an RAOC to direct and control RAS and will effect coordination with other RAOCs, as appropriate. In cases where two or more MWSSs may be collocated, the airbase commander will designate one MWSS as being responsible for establishing the RAOC and coordinating RAS.

d. In the event that the CSSE and the ACE are collocated or are in close proximity, the CSSE commander will normally be the RASC since the CSSE commander is usually best located, equipped, and staffed to manage the RAS mission. The CSSE commander is also readily familiar with the disposition and capabilities of the majority of units that operate in the rear area. RAS coordination is situation-dependent and must be initiated between the CSSE RAOC and any ACE RAOCs,

as appropriate. The RASC will have coordinating authority over all elements in the MAGTF rear area. (Coordinating authority is defined by Joint Pub 1-02 as the authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more Services or two or more forces of the same Service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement

he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority.)

**NOTE:** This definition for "coordinating authority" is the NATO entry in Joint Pub 1-02. Normally, for a Service doctrinal publication, the DOD entry is considered more appropriate. If the four Services had fully embraced the NATO definition, without reservation, the entry would be listed as DOD, NATO and there would not be a different version for DOD only.

**NOTE:** Although this publication does not address GCE RAS, many of the principles contained herein are applicable.

## Chapter 2

# The Threat

### 2001. General

Throughout the spectrum of conflict, Marine forces will face threats to the rear area. In low intensity conflict, improved warfare technology and tactics have increased the capabilities of small forces operating against larger conventional forces. In mid- and high intensity conflict, sophisticated weapons systems have made the rear area extremely vulnerable. Understanding and being able to deal with the threat to rear areas could be the key to modern battlefield survival.

Marine forces would most probably face a Soviet-styled or Soviet-trained force. Soviet doctrine emphasizes the disruption of rear area operations to reduce combat service support to the main battle. This is usually accomplished by a combination of massed fires on key objectives and the exploitation of breakthroughs to concentrate maneuver forces, such as the operational maneuver group (OMG), rapidly into the rear area. Airborne, air assault, or amphibious assault landings could complement these ground penetrations. Command and control centers, nuclear storage sites, and delivery means, CSS facilities, airbases, LOCs, and operations centers would be the priority targets. Rear area commanders must recognize that the threat can range from the lone terrorist to the type of combined arms attack described above.

Marine forces should also be aware that they may engage Soviet-type forces. These forces are organized and prepared to enter the MAGTF rear area from the air, ground, and sea. In the early stages of a conflict, rear area units can expect to encounter threat ground forces and specialized units such as SPETSNAZ, airborne, and air assault forces. Other potential enemies located in various parts of

parts of the world can also be expected to attack rear areas with an assortment of regular and specialized units. Many of those units will be trained and organized by Soviet advisors.

Third World forces are equally capable of effectively attacking the rear areas of modern conventional forces. A MAGTF that is committed to a low intensity conflict in the Third World will have to contend with dedicated irregular forces equipped with sophisticated weapons. Units located in the MAGTF rear area are prime targets for those forces and will have to be prepared to defend themselves.

### 2002. Threat Response Levels

The three levels of response to threat activities to assist the commander in planning RAS are as follows:

- a. **Level I.** Those threats which can be defeated by local defense.
- b. **Level II.** Those threats which are beyond the capabilities of local defense, but which can be defeated by reaction forces. Local defenses must be able to contain Level II threats until the arrival of reaction forces.
- c. **Level III.** Those threats which require the MAGTF commander to employ units of the GCE to defeat them.

## 2003. Threat Capabilities

**a. Enemy Controlled Agents.** Regardless of the area in which a MAGTF may be employed, enemy agents pose a considerable threat. Estimates of the number of agents located in NATO countries that are controlled directly or indirectly by Soviet intelligence and security organizations range up to 20,000. Espionage, interdiction, and subversion are among the primary missions of these agents. During peacetime, these agents are employed in a passive role and serve as intelligence collectors. Their transition to active offensive operations is often associated with a buildup in preparation for war.

**b. Sabotage by Enemy Sympathizers.** Civilians within the MAGTF area of operations may be sympathetic to the enemy and, while not a part of any organized agent cell or activity, could constitute a threat to the rear area. Activities could include random acts of sabotage, arson, theft, and assassination. Civil disturbance or disruption by the host nation populace is also possible.

**c. Terrorism.** Terrorists instill fear by violence or threats of violence to obtain political, religious, or ideological goals. Terrorist acts can include bombings, arson, vehicle/aircraft hijacking, ambushes, kidnappings, hostage-taking, robbery, or assassination. All personnel and facilities in the rear area are vulnerable to terrorist acts.

**d. Diversionary and Sabotage Operations.** Soviet SPETZNAZ forces are highly trained special purpose forces that can be inserted into an objective area prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities. Manned by skilled officers and senior non-commissioned officers, SPETZNAZ forces undergo training in demolitions, communications, foreign weapons, and languages. SPETZNAZ troops can blend in with the civilian populace of the target country and can conduct reconnaissance missions as well as disrupt or destroy critical military targets and installations in the rear area.

**e. Raid and Reconnaissance Missions Conducted by Combat Units.** Soviet tank and motorized divisions contain reconnaissance battalions. Each tank and motorized regiment contains a reconnaissance company whose primary mission is reconnaissance of the enemy rear area. However, the reconnaissance company may be directed to raid installations, locate reserves, identify boundaries between units, or conduct surveillance of unit positions or movements.

**f. Special/Unconventional Warfare Missions.** Usually conducted by company-sized or smaller parachute or helicopterborne forces, special/unconventional warfare missions include target reconnaissance, sabotage, raids, disruption of command and control means, and destruction of CSS facilities.

**g. Helicopterborne Operations.** Soviet helicopterborne forces, usually of battalion size or smaller, can be inserted into the MAGTF rear area primarily to attack command and control elements or communication facilities. They may also be tasked with conducting raids, ambushes, sabotage, and laying/clearing minefields in the rear area.

**h. Airborne Operations.** Soviet airborne forces are used to conduct deep assault missions in the enemy rear area and may be inserted to support the attack of an OMG. These forces are usually dropped with organic armored vehicles. Soviet doctrine lists four types of airborne operations:

(1) **Strategic Airborne Assault.** A deep strike that is used against key strategic facilities: national capitals, administrative and political centers, industrial and economic centers, ports, and airfields.

(2) **Operational Airborne Assault.** An assault that is usually conducted in support of a front

offensive. Its missions include attacking key targets such as bridgeheads, command and control facilities, airfields, or river crossing sites.

**(3) Tactical Airborne Assault.** An assault that is normally conducted by a reinforced company or battalion against a specific objective such as nuclear weapons storage/delivery sites, logistic facilities, communications sites, airfields, and command posts.

**(4) Special Airborne Operations.** Operations that are conducted by company-sized or smaller units and usually directed by the KGB. Sabotage and reconnaissance are the primary missions. They may be directed to destroy nuclear delivery means or destroy or deny the use of critical facilities through demolition, arson, or flooding.

**i. Amphibious Operations.** Recent developments in the operational capabilities of Soviet naval infantry have resulted in a significant seaborne threat against critical rear area ports and facilities. Capable of conducting tactical landings with highly mobile forces, air-cushioned vehicles, and high-speed landing ships, Soviet naval infantry may execute the following:

**(1) Strategic Landing.** A multidivision landing with naval and air support to open or expand a military operation.

**(2) Operational Landing.** A regiment- or division-sized landing to seize an island, base, or coastal facility.

**(3) Tactical Landing.** A strike of battalion size or larger against an enemy coastline or facilities and may be conducted in support of an inland ground force operation.

**(4) Reconnaissance/Sabotage Landing.** A landing conducted by a battalion, company, or platoon against coastal facilities.

## 2004. Effects of Threat Tactics

The enemy will attack the MAGTF rear area in an attempt to accomplish the following:

- Force the MAGTF commander to divert combat forces from their primary missions.
- Require CSS units to concentrate on RAS tasks thereby degrading support effectiveness.
- Cause a loss of tactical mobility by disrupting resupply efforts.
- Force units to disperse to an extent greater than acceptable for the mission.
- Cause civilian labor to quit or be withdrawn from assisting support operations.
- Force CSS facilities to move to less suitable areas to enhance survivability.

# Chapter 3

## Organization

### Section I. Combat Service Support Element

#### 3101. Rear Area Operations Center

The RAOC will be task-organized and collocated with the CSSE CSSOC to direct and control the RAS effort. Communication with the RAOC from units/facilities will be over the CSS security net. (See par. 4005, *Communications*, of FMFM 4-1, *Combat Service Support Operations, under development*.) The RAOC will be supervised by the TSO and the functions of the RAOC will be the following:

- Plan, coordinate, and control RAS for the CSSE and if so tasked, for the active MAGTF.
- Plan, coordinate, and control fire/aviation support for RAS.
- Effect coordination with ACE RAOCs.
- Coordinate missions of the provisional security forces with the military police (MP) company commander.
- Effect coordination with the MAGTF command element and GCE operations section.
- Monitor unit/facility positions and movement throughout the MAGTF rear area.
- Make recommendations to the RASC for security force augmentation as the situation warrants.
- Coordinate the area damage control effort.

#### 3102. Provisional Security Forces

In conjunction with the response being proportionate to the threat, a MEF RASC may be able to organize two types of provisional security forces: the provisional mobile security platoons (PMSPs) and the

provisional helicopterborne security company. MAGTFs smaller than MEF will need to establish security response units proportional to their task organization's capabilities. Based on the mission and threat assessment, these units can be used to supplement local defense efforts and to give assistance to the military police in the performance of their RAS missions. Based on the situation and nature of the enemy threat, the TSO can divert any element of the provisional security forces to perform any critically perceived RAS function, such as augmenting the local security of a key installation.

**a. Provisional Mobile Security Platoons.** PMSPs provide a quick reaction capability in support of the RAS effort. The force service support group (FSSG) is capable of fielding two PMSPs. During normal combat operations, the PMSPs should be attached to the MP company of the FSSG. The MP company commander will coordinate with the TSO to ensure proper utilization of the PMSPs. When not attached to the military police, the PMSPs will be under the operational control of the RAOC. Figures 3-1 and 3-2 depict the notional organization and equipment of the PMSPs. The eight gun vehicles and eight troop-carrying vehicles to be used by the PMSPs will be obtained from the MP company. The PMSPs can be tasked with the following missions:

- Relief/rescue of attacked installations/units.
- Route patrolling and convoy protection.
- Surveillance/reconnaissance.
- Defense of possible enemy drop/landing zones.
- Finding, fixing, destroying enemy forces operating in the rear area.

1 OFFICER 38 ENLISTED

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
Plat Comdr	Lt	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
Plat Sgt	SSgt	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
Radio Opr	Cpl	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn

1st Wpns Sqd2d Wpns Sqd

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
Sqd Ldr/Gunner	Sgt	M-16	MTBn
Driver	LCpl	M-16	MTBn
Loader	PFC	M-16 w/M-203	MTBn

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
Sqd Ldr/Gunner	Sgt	M-16	MTBn
Driver	LCpl	M-16	MTBn
Loader	PFC	M-16 w/M-203	MTBn

HMMWV Wpns Carrier w/M-2 .50 cal mounted

HMMWV Wpns Carrier w/M-2 .50 cal mounted

Veh Comdr/Gunner	Cpl	M-16	MTBn
Driver	LCpl	M-16	MTBn
Loader	PFC	M-16 w/M-203	MTBn

Veh Comdr/Gunner	Cpl	M-16	MTBn
Driver	LCpl	M-16	MTBn
Loader	PFC	M-16 w/M-203	MTBn

HMMWV Wpns Carrier w/MK-19 mounted

HMMWV Wpns Carrier w/MK-19 mounted

1st Inf Sqd2d Inf Sqd

Sqd Ldr	Sgt	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
Radio Opr	PFC	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn
FTLdr	Cpl	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn
GR	LCpl	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
GR	PFC	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
AR	LCpl	SAW	ServCo, H&SBn
R/Driver	PFC	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn
FTLdr	Cpl	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn
GR	LCpl	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
GR	PFC	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
AR	LCpl	SAW	ServCo, H&SBn
R/Driver	PFC	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn

Sqd Ldr	Sgt	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
Radio Opr	PFC	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn
FTLdr	Cpl	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn
GR	LCpl	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
GR	PFC	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
AR	LCpl	SAW	ServCo, H&SBn
R/Driver	PFC	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn
FTLdr	Cpl	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn
GR	LCpl	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
GR	PFC	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
AR	LCpl	SAW	ServCo, H&SBn
R/Driver	PFC	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn

2 HMMWV Troop Carriers

2 HMMWV Troop Carriers

Figure 3-1. Notional 1st Provisional Mobile Security Platoon.

1 OFFICER 38 ENLISTED

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
Plat Comdr	Lt	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
Plat Sgt	SSgt	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
Radio Opr	Cpl	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn

1st Wpns Sqd

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
Sqd Ldr/Gunner	Sgt	M-16	MaintBn
Driver	LCpl	M-16	MaintBn
Loader	PFC	M-16 w/M-203	MaintBn

HMMWV Wpns Carrier w/M-2 .50 cal mounted

Veh Comdr/Gunner	Cpl	M-16	MaintBn
Driver	LCpl	M-16	MaintBn
Loader	PFC	M-16 w/M-203	MaintBn

HMMWV Wpns Carrier w/MK-19 mounted

2d Wpns Sqd

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
Sqd Ldr/Gunner	Sgt	M-16	MaintBn
Driver	LCpl	M-16	MaintBn
Loader	PFC	M-16 w/M-203	MaintBn

HMMWV Wpns Carrier w/M-2 .50 cal mounted

Veh Comdr/Gunner	Cpl	M-16	MaintBn
Driver	LCpl	M-16	MaintBn
Loader	PFC	M-16 w/M-203	MaintBn

HMMWV Wpns Carrier w/MK-19 mounted

1st Inf Sqd

Sqd Ldr	Sgt	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
Radio Opr	PFC	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn
FTLdr	Cpl	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn
GR	LCpl	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
GR	PFC	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
AR	LCpl	SAW	ServCo, H&SBn
R/Driver	PFC	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn
FTLdr	Cpl	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn
GR	LCpl	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
GR	PFC	M-16 w/M-203	ServCo, H&SBn
AR	LCpl	SAW	ServCo, H&SBn
R/Driver	PFC	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn

2 HMMWV Troop Carriers

2d Inf Sqd

Sqd Ldr	Sgt	M-16 w/M-203	SupBn
Radio Opr	PFC	M-16	SupBn
FTLdr	Cpl	M-16	SupBn
GR	LCpl	M-16 w/M-203	SupBn
GR	PFC	M-16 w/M-203	SupBn
AR	LCpl	SAW	SupBn
R/Driver	PFC	M-16	SupBn
FTLdr	Cpl	M-16	SupBn
GR	LCpl	M-16 w/M-203	SupBn
GR	PFC	M-16 w/M-203	SupBn
AR	LCpl	SAW	SupBn
R/Driver	PFC	M-16	SupBn

2 HMMWV Troop Carriers

Figure 3-2. Notional 2d Provisional Mobile Security Platoon.

**b. Provisional Helicopterborne Security Company.** The provisional helicopterborne security company provides the RASC with a highly mobile reaction force capable of operating over extended distances, performing the same missions as the PMSPs. This includes the patrolling of areas away from CSSE/ACE facilities and LOCs/MSRs. Figure 3-3 depicts the notional organization and equipment of the provisional helicopterborne security company. Missions assigned to the provisional helicopterborne security company will be coordinated by the TSO. Based on the situation and nature of the enemy threat, the TSO can divert any element of the provisional security forces to perform any critically perceived RAS function, such as augmenting the local security of a key installation.

### 3103. Force Service Support Group Military Police

a. The MP company of the FSSG's H&SBn will perform the following missions:

- Provide military police to conduct battlefield circulation control for the MAGTF (MSR/LOC security).

- Provide military police for the conduct of RAS operations.
- Provide military police for law enforcement, criminal investigation, U.S. prisoner confinement, and terrorism counteraction.
- Establish surveillance and conduct route reconnaissance in the MAGTF rear area.
- Provide for the collection, processing, and evacuation of enemy prisoners of war (POW) and civilian internees in the MAGTF rear area.

b. The MP company commander will coordinate the company's RAS efforts with the TSO. Further coordination must be effected with the MP departments of the ACE's MWSSs. (For further discussion of MP capabilities, see FMFM 3-5, *Employment of Military Police in Combat* which is under development.)

5 OFFICER 183 ENLISTED

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
Co Comdr	Capt	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn
Co XO/Fwd Obs	1stLt	M-16	LSS, H&SBn
Co 1stSgt	MSgt	M-16	LSS, H&SBn
Co GySgt	GySgt	M-16	ServCo, H&SBn
Arty Scout/Radio Opr	Sgt	M-16	LSS, H&SBn
Radio Opr (FSSG TAC)	Cpl	M-16	LSS, H&SBn
Radio Opr (Co TAC)	LCpl	M-16	LSS, H&SBn
Hvy MG Sqd (3 Teams)		MK-19	SupBn
Sqd Ldr	Sgt	M-16	SupBn
Tm Ldr/Gunner	Cpl	9 mm	SupBn
A Gunner	LCpl	9 mm	SupBn
Ammo Man	PFC	M-16	SupBn
Ammo Man	PFC	M-16	SupBn

SOURCE

	<u>1st Platoon</u>	<u>2d Platoon</u>	<u>3d Platoon</u>
Plat Comdr	EngrSptBn	ServCo, H&SBn	LSS, H&SBn
Plat Sgt	EngrSptBn	ServCo, H&SBn	LSS, H&SBn
Radio Opr	EngrSptBn	ServCo, H&SBn	LSS, H&SBn
1st Squad	EngrSptBn	SupBn	MaintBn
2d Squad	EngrSptBn	SupBn	LSBn
3d Squad	EngrSptBn	SupBn	LSBn
M60 MG Squad	EngrSptBn	MedBn	MaintBn
85 mm ARL (SMAW) Squad	EngrSptBn	MedBn	MaintBn

Rifle Platoon (3)

M-60 MG Squad (3)

85 mm ARL (SMAW) Squad (3)

Plat Comdr	2dLt	9 mm	Sqd Ldr	Sgt	M-16	Sqd Ldr	Sgt	M-16
Plat Sgt	SSgt	9 mm	(2) Tm Ldr/Gunner	Cpl	9 mm	(2) Tm Ldr	Cpl	9 mm
Radio Opr	Cpl	M-16	(2) Tm Gunner	LCpl	9 mm	(2) Ammo	LCpl	M-16
Squad	13 Man	Standard Arms	(2) Tm Ammo	PFC	M-16	(2) Ammo	PFC	M-16

Figure 3-3. Notional Provisional Helicopterborne Security Company.

## Section II. Aviation Combat Element

### 3201. Rear Area Operations Center

The RAOC will be task-organized and collocated with the MWSS operations section to direct and control the ACE RAS effort. Because of the organization of the MAW, it is possible to have four functioning RAOCs. When two or more MWSSs are collocated, the ACE commander will designate one as being responsible for setting up the RAOC and coordinating RAS for that respective airbase. The RAOC will be supervised by the TSO and the functions of the RAOC will be as follows:

- Plan, coordinate, and control RAS for its respective airbase.
- Plan, coordinate, and control fire support for RAS.
- Effect coordination with the CSSE RAOC.
- Coordinate missions of provisional security forces with the airbase commander.
- Effect coordination with the MAGTF command element.
- Effect coordination with other ACE RAOCs.
- Coordinate the area damage control effort.

### 3202. Provisional Security Forces

Each ACE airfield has several tenant units from which it can draw for defense of the airfield. Because

the composition of each airfield can vary extensively due to task organization and mission assignment, local SOPs and directives will govern the size, assets, and methods of employment for ACE provisional security forces.

### 3203. Marine Aircraft Wing Military Police

a. The MP department of the ACE's MWSS will perform the following missions:

- Provide area security to include security for flight line, ammunition, fuel storage, and air traffic control facilities.
- Provide an MP response force for the conduct of airbase ground defense (ABGD).
- Establish surveillance and conduct route reconnaissance in conjunction with ABGD.
- Provide straggler/POW/refugee control.
- Provide traffic control/enforcement and traffic accident investigation.

b. The MP department officer in charge will coordinate ABGD measures with the TSO. Other coordination must be effected with the MP company of the FSSG as needed.

## Chapter 4

# Defense of the MAGTF Rear Area

## Section I. Base Defense

### 4101. General

The MAGTF rear area will normally contain units located in permanent, semipermanent, and temporary positions. Airfields, command posts, supply dumps, and maintenance facilities are examples of such positions. One or more units occupying proximate positions can be organized into a base. A base is an area or locality from which operations are projected or supported and contains installations which provide logistic or other support. A base has a defined perimeter, interior lines of communication established access controls, and the minimum surrounding area necessary for local security. The base commander is the unit commander or the senior unit commander when more than one unit occupies the base.

### 4102. Concepts

a. Units occupying a base are responsible for its defense. Base defense should provide all-round security with a minimum of available forces. The objectives of base defense are to maintain a secure base and to minimize disruptions to primary support missions. The base commander prepares the defense based on an estimate of the situation, the threat assessment, and available resources. The defense is organized in depth with mutually supporting positions. (For a comprehensive discussion of defensive operations, see FMFM 6-1, *Ground Combat Operations*, under development.)

b. After the site for a base has been selected, the base commander should begin organizing the defense. This entails a priority of work which normally include—

- Establishing security.
- Positioning crew-served weapons.
- Clearing fields of fire and organizing defensive fires.
- Preparing primary positions.
- Constructing obstacles.
- Selecting and preparing alternate/supplementary positions.
- Constructing dummy positions.

c. Work proceeds simultaneously on these various tasks. Defensive positions should continually be improved and expanded. The base commander must exploit any advantages the surrounding terrain may offer. The defense should be tied to natural obstacles when possible; natural obstacles should be covered with fire; and key terrain outside the perimeter should be occupied, patrolled, and/or targeted. It is important to note that the base commander should not try to defend everywhere at once. Units occupying large bases usually lack the manpower to adequately defend extensive perimeters. The commander should concentrate forces along likely avenues of approach, on key

terrain, and around critical positions. Unoccupied portions of the perimeter can be effectively covered by a combination of indirect/direct fire, obstacles, sensors, and other surveillance devices.

d. Specific defensive measures available to the commander include—

- Establishing identification procedures.
- Specifying base entry/exit points.
- Planning and rehearsing immediate action drills.
- Enforcing noise/light discipline.
- Coordinating defensive fires.

### 4103. Planning

a. The base commander issues a comprehensive base defense plan to ensure that available resources are used effectively. This plan should address the following areas:

- Command relationships.
- General security measures.
- Coordination of security measures.
- Priorities of defensive tasks.
- Active/passive defense measures.
- Critical area designation.
- Air defense/warning control/coordination.
- Fire support coordination.
- Coordination with the RAOC.

b. The base commander must also analyze the area to be defended and should consider the following:

- Obstacles/barriers.
- Early warning assets (air/reconnaissance units).
- Surveillance devices.
- Reduced visibility defense.
- Unit dispersion.
- Civilian population control.
- Existing defensive measures planned by the RAOC.

c. In his defensive planning efforts, the base commander must consider the use of all available intelligence assets. Timely and accurate intelligence data enhances the base commander's ability to conduct the defense. (See FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*, under development.)

### 4104. Tasks

In order for a base defense system to be effective, the following tasks must be accomplished:

a. **Securing the Base.** The base commander ensures the security of the base by establishing defensive measures which are outlined in a defensive plan/order. A copy of that plan/order is passed to the RAOC. A successful base defense contributes to overall rear area security and mission accomplishment.

b. **Detecting the Enemy.** Units occupying front-line positions can provide early warning of enemy infiltration attempts to the MAGTF, who can relay that information to rear area commanders through the RAOC. NBC detection and warning procedures must also be established. Aggressive patrolling in the rear area by MPs and provisional security forces, establishing listening posts/observation posts (LPs/OPs), and obtaining information from indigenous personnel could provide indications of pending enemy action.

c. **Delaying the Enemy.** The base defense system must be organized in such a way that after detection and warning of pending enemy action, the enemy is canalized and the momentum of his attack is sufficiently slowed to permit base security forces time to respond. Delay is accomplished by employing obstacles such as minefields, wire barriers, and natural terrain. All obstacles should be covered by direct/indirect fire.

**d. Destroying the Enemy.** Once the enemy has been detected and delayed, it must be destroyed. In order to respond proportionally to the threat, the tactical security officer will coordinate the actions of the provisional security forces. Continuous coordination between the RAOC and security forces is necessary so that the TSO can properly evaluate the situation and make appropriate recommendations to the RASC.

## 4105. Area Damage Control

**a.** The destructive capabilities of today's weapons systems significantly increase the need for effective area damage control (ADC). ADC is defined as measures taken before, during, or after hostile action or natural or manmade disasters to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects (Joint Pub 1-02). All units/facilities are responsible for providing ADC to the maximum extent possible within operational and resource capabilities. Effective planning, establishment of specific responsibilities, and use of all available assets to conduct ADC are necessary to ensure continuous support and immediate restoration of CSS operations.

**b.** The availability of ADC assets in the MAGTF rear area will be extremely limited. ADC assets will usually be diverted from other missions. The RASC should coordinate with the host nation, military police, engineer units, and the naval construction force to determine ADC capabilities and to ensure that all available ADC resources have been identified and employed. The ADC effort will be coordinated through the RAOC.

**c.** The following ADC measures can be taken to enhance the ADC effort:

### (1) Before incident:

- Designate ADC responsibilities.
- Disperse/harden units/facilities.
- Establish ADC priorities and assess unit vulnerabilities.
- Prepare, coordinate, and rehearse ADC plans.
- Establish communication and warning procedures.
- Designate alternate operational sites.
- Maintain personnel roster for each unit/facility to expedite casualty search and rescue operations.
- Identify food, water, medical, and other critical supplies available for emergency distribution.
- Coordinate ADC assistance from non-organic units.
- Coordinate ADC assistance from the host nation.

### (2) During and after incident:

- Assess damage, isolate danger areas, and provide updates to the RAOC.
- Prevent/fight fires.
- Administer medical aid and evacuate casualties.
- Restore mission-essential operations.
- Reestablish communications.
- Remove/dispose unexploded ordnance.
- Conduct NBC survey/decontamination as required.
- Clear rubble/debris.
- Distribute emergency food, water, clothing, and fuel.

## Section II. MAGTF Rear Area Defense

### 4201. General

Defense of the MAGTF rear area requires extensive coordination among the various types of units and facilities. Expansive MSRs/LOCs, geographical isolation, and an intense operational tempo compound the problem of rear area defense. In order to buy the MAGTF commander time to counter the threat, the priority must be put in local defense and provisional security forces capable of reacting to the threat. In addition to local security and reaction forces, the CSSE and ACE may have access to the same supporting arms systems available to the GCE. Artillery, mortars, naval gunfire, attack helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and various host nation assets are important force multipliers which must be considered and incorporated into the RAS effort.

### 4202. Rear Area Security Tasks

#### a. Defense of CSSE and ACE Facilities

(1) The local commander is responsible for the defense of his unit/facility. Initial Level I response is from the unit's/facility's individual Marines. As the threat becomes more severe, requiring a Level II response, military police and provisional security forces are called upon to frustrate the enemy's attempt to disrupt CSSE/ACE operations. Missions of the military police and provisional security forces are coordinated through the RAOCs. When the rear area threat exceeds the capabilities of the military police and provisional security forces, the TSO will notify the G-3/S-3 who will notify the RASC. The RASC makes the decision to request GCE assistance from the MAGTF commander. Should employment of GCE units be required for a Level III response, coordination will be effected among the RAOCs and GCE combat operations center. (See paragraph 4203 for a more detailed discussion on the GCE in RAS operations.)

(2) Fire support in defense of the CSSE/ACE will be coordinated through that respective RAOC. (For a detailed account of fire support in RAS, see chapter 5.)

#### b. Security of MSRs/LOCs

(1) The primary RAS mission for the military police is to provide security for MSRs/LOCs. MPs continuously move throughout the MAGTF rear area conducting foot and motor patrols to ensure the safe passage of personnel and supplies. MPs can conduct hasty reconnaissance, seek new or alternate routes, and serve as an important intelligence gathering source. The military police will coordinate all RAS missions through the RAOC. (See FMFM 3-5, *Employment of Military Police in Combat*, under development.)

(2) The provisional security forces provide additional sources for MSR/LOC security. They can be attached to the military police or remain under the operational control of the RAOC.

#### c. Security of Areas Outside CSSE/ACE Facilities and Areas Away From MSRs/LOCs

(1) The RASC may decide that the security of areas outside of the CSSE/ACE facilities and away from MSRs/LOCs is vital to the defense of the MAGTF rear area. These areas can include key terrain, avenues of approach, chokepoints, possible enemy assembly areas or drop/landing zones, or a combination of any of these. The RASC may decide to patrol these areas or set up LPs/OPs. Elements of the provisional security forces can best accomplish this type of mission. The provisional helicopter-borne security company is specifically suited for this assignment because of its inherent speed and mobility.

(2) Coordination between CSSE and ACE RAOCs is imperative to avoid duplication of effort and potential fire support coordination problems.

**d. Air Defense.** Air defense is defined as all defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in the earth's envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack (Joint Pub 1-02). In the MAGTF rear area, air defense sectors will be designated by the ACE commander. Air defense is divided into active and passive tasks. Active tasks include surveillance, weapons control and management, and weapons employment. Passive measures include cover, concealment, camouflage, and deception. (See FMFM 5-5, *Antiair Warfare* and FMFRP 5-54, *Small Arms Defense Against Air Attack*, for a comprehensive discussion on air defense.)

#### **4203. Ground Combat Element Employment in Rear Area Security**

**a.** Units from the GCE should be assigned an RAS mission only when the MAGTF mission

becomes jeopardized. The MAGTF commander can task GCE units to participate in the RAS effort should the threat require a Level III response. This does not preclude the use of GCE units that are in transit, resting, or performing other duties in the MAGTF rear area.

**b.** When GCE units are assigned an RAS mission, they will be placed under the operational control of the RASC. Upon arrival in the MAGTF rear area, the GCE unit leader will coordinate with the RAOC to receive mission assignment/clarification, operations and intelligence updates, and other necessary coordinating instructions. All requests for operational/logistical support will be coordinated through the RAOC. When the GCE unit is no longer required to perform the RAS mission, it will revert to its parent command.

**c.** When the RAS effort requires a large scale commitment of GCE forces, the MAGTF commander may assume direct control of RAS activities or pass control to the GCE commander as the situation permits.

## Chapter 5

# Fire Support for Rear Area Security

### 5001. General

There will rarely be sufficient MAGTF fire support assets to simultaneously support the main battle and the RAS effort. Fire support assets will seldom, if ever, have the primary mission of supporting RAS operations. However, the availability and timely use of fire support can be critical to the continuation of CSSE/ACE functions. Thus, the burden is placed upon the RASC to manipulate limited resources at the right time and place to ensure the sustainability of the main effort.

Fires in support of RAS should primarily be observed fires on targets of opportunity. Unobserved fires will rarely, if ever, be used in RAS operations. This is because the intermingling of combatants and civilians would make it difficult or impossible to conduct an indirect-fire attack without causing collateral damage and casualties. The fire support coordinator (FSC) in the RAOC will mainly be concerned with clearing fire missions where *silence is not consent*. Positive clearance of fire missions in support of RAS is imperative. Targeting, per se, will not be a primary FSC function.

### 5002. Fire Support Assets

**a. Attack Helicopters.** Fire support from attack helicopters has considerable potential in an RAS role because attack helicopters are very responsive assets which require no supplementary observers. Attack helicopters also possess a significant loiter time in the target area and have the capability to destroy almost any target. Controlling attack helicopters is considerably easier than controlling close air support (CAS) for a unit

without a forward air controller. Although helicopters are vulnerable to ground air-defense weapons, including small arms, the threat to helicopters in the rear area should be considerably less than in the main battle area.

**b. Mortars.** Mortars are the most rapidly responsive of the supporting arms. Although limited in the choice of munitions, mortars are an excellent antipersonnel weapon, making them suitable for most RAS targets. A disadvantage of mortars is that their fires are difficult to sustain because of rapid expenditure of ammunition and limited resupply capability. This disadvantage can be overcome by prepositioning mortar sites in the rear area and stockpiling ammunition at these sites.

**c. Artillery.** Artillery is highly responsive, accurate, and capable of delivering a wide range of munitions. When the situation dictates, artillery in support of RAS can be arranged by providing special instructions and modifying some of the inherent responsibilities in an artillery battalion's tactical mission, such as: 4th Battalion 10th Marines, general support, 2d MarDiv, answer calls for fire from RASC 2d FSSG (first priority), establish communications with RAOC 2d FSSG, provide liaison to RAOC 2d FSSG. Another advantage of artillery in support of RAS is that the artillery battalion fire direction center (FDC) is more capable of finding a unit available to fire, more so than a mortar FDC or a naval gunfire support ship, and passing a fire order to that unit, even during periods of high activity. This is because artillery is the only supporting arm with a headquarters organization capable of immediately

controlling multiple firing units. A disadvantage of artillery is that support of RAS is not likely to be a primary mission which could be detrimental to the responsiveness required for RAS missions.

**d. Naval Gunfire (NGF).** NGF can deliver high volumes of fire very quickly and has about the same variety of munitions as does artillery. Although NGF spot teams are normally assigned to the GCE, they can be dispatched to the MAGTF rear area when the GCE is no longer within range of the NGF support ship(s). The greatest disadvantage of NGF is that its high range probable error reduces its effectiveness for close-in support when units in contact are on the gun-target line. This can be a major problem in RAS operations where pinpoint accuracy may be required and collateral damage must be minimized. Another disadvantage of NGF is it is not easy to obtain without a trained and equipped NGF spot team.

**e. Fixed-Wing Attack Aircraft.** Immediate CAS against targets of opportunity is the most likely RAS mission for fixed-wing attack aircraft. Air-delivered ordnance is generally the most lethal of the supporting arms, and attack aircraft can respond rapidly to achieve surprise. However, unless the target warrants the use of air, such as large troop concentrations, air support would be less suitable than surface-fired supporting arms and is unlikely to play a major role in most RAS scenarios. (See paragraph 5004 for a discussion of CAS in an RAS role.)

## 5003. Fire Support Considerations

**a. Fire Support Reduction to the Main Battle Effort.** RAS fire support missions will have low priority in the overall scheme of maneuver. RAS fire missions would not be fired to the detriment of the main battle.

**b. Suitability as Determined by the Tactical Situation.** Indirect fire assets should not be employed in situations requiring a Level I response. These targets would probably be too small and fleeting to be engaged effectively with supporting arms. Level II and Level III responses against sizable enemy forces are more appropriate for use of indirect fire means. The FSC in the RAOC has to make the determination as to which fire support asset can best engage the target.

**c. Responsiveness of the Available Weapons Systems.** When time is a critical factor, the FSC will obviously want the weapons system which can quickly respond to the situation. At times, the FSC may have to settle for the weapons system that is available to fire, even though it may not be the most appropriate.

**d. Precision and Collateral Damage Effect of the Weapons Systems.** The rear area may be interspersed with civilian population centers, key facilities, and host nation historic monuments or buildings. If this is the case, then precision must be maximized and collateral damage minimized in the use of indirect fire assets.

**e. Availability of Observers to Identify Targets and Adjust Fires.** Use of supporting arms coordinators (airborne) (SAC[A]) must be maximized in RAS operations. The SAC(A) is capable of conducting aerial reconnaissance/surveillance and of exercising control from the air of aircraft engaged in close air/close-in fire support. It also provides an artillery/NGF spotting capability. Assets available for this mission are located in the Marine observation squadron. The availability of trained ground observers to identify and adjust fires will be extremely limited in the rear area, dictating the need for positive clearance of all fire missions.

## 5004. Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support

### a. Close Air Support

(1) In general, there is a lower probability of enemy air-to-air interference and reduced levels of enemy surface-to-air threats in RAS operations. Specifically, CAS is not appropriate for a Level I and II response and may be used infrequently in RAS operations. However, it may be critical to the initial stages of a Level III response. The RASC should consider use of CAS against the following:

(a) Level III-type forces.

(b) Larger formations of Level II-type forces when they can be found, fixed, and identified to CAS aircraft.

(c) Those Level I- and II-type threats to high priority target, where other fire support assets are not available and the critical need outweighs the possibility of collateral damage and low probability of effectiveness.

(d) Penetration of enemy forces before friendly maneuver forces can engage.

(2) An emphasis must be placed upon the maximum use of an SAC(A) in RAS CAS because tactical air control parties will be located with the GCE and will not be available to the RASC, and because CAS-delivered munitions are dependent upon visual means for delivery.

### b. Close-In Fire Support (CIFS)

(1) CIFS is defined as air action unique to attack helicopters against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces. (For more information, see FMFM 5-4A, *Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support*). When not employed in aerial or ground escort operations, attack helicopters may—

- Provide CIFS.
- Provide fire support coordination.
- Act as an SAC(A).
- Assist in the suppression of enemy air defenses.

(2) The attack helicopter can respond to any level of threat to the rear area because it can allow for multiple runs, easy target identification, an accurate weapons platform, and it has the capability to destroy almost any target. In certain situations such as poor weather or intensive jamming, attack helicopters may be the only feasible means of aerial fire support available to the rear area.

## 5005. Fire Support Coordination

a. Requests for fire support in the MAGTF rear area can originate from units, bases, facilities, aerial observers, military police, or provisional mobile security forces. The fire support coordination center in the RAOC will have to act as both the coordinator of fire support between requesting units and fire support assets and as the communications link between the two elements.

b. The FSC located in the RAOC will provide fire support coordination in RAS operations. The FSC's duties will not differ from standard operations (see FMFM 6-18, *Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination*, under development), with the exception that in RAS the FSC will be more involved in coordination than in planning and targeting. The FSC will positively clear all fire missions in the MAGTF rear area; SILENCE IS NOT CONSENT. The FSC's duties in RAS will include—

- Advising the TSO on all matters pertaining to RAS fire support.
- Recommending fire support coordination measures to the TSO.

- Providing positive clearance on fire support missions from units/facilities in the MAGTF rear area.
- Advising the TSO on target selection and attack precedence.

**c.** The fire support coordination center (FSCC) located in the RAOC will operate on a much smaller scale than FSCCs located in the GCE. It will be task-organized and at a minimum should include an air representative and an FSC chief. The FSCC will be supervised by the FSC and set up to operate on a 24-hour a day basis. (See FMFM 6-18 for a discussion of the operation of the FSCC.)

**d.** Fire support coordination measures in RAS operations will not differ from those used forward of the GCE rear boundary. The RASC will have the authority to establish the needed fire support coordination measures within the MAGTF rear area. These measures can include:

**(1) Restrictive Fire Areas (RFAs).** RFAs are usually established around bases. Unless fires are requested by the base itself, the fires are confined to restricted areas.

**(2) No Fire Areas (NFAs).** NFAs are usually established around host nation population centers and key civilian/military facilities. Fires into these areas are prohibited unless authorized by the establishing authority or

in cases involving immediate self-defense. Coordination with the host nation is essential.

**(3) Free Fire Areas (FFAs).** FFAs are usually established around known enemy forces or planned around possible landing zones/drop zones which allows an expedited response to any enemy action. Because of the nature of FFAs, the RASC must coordinate with the host nation, if applicable, and abide by all host nation agreements/conditions.

## 5006. Fire Support Communications

Requests for fire support from the MAGTF rear area will be cleared through the RAOC FSC who will relay those requests to the senior GCE FSCC. Requests for air support from the MAGTF rear area will be cleared through the air liaison officer in the RAOC and relayed to the DASC. (The senior FSCC is usually collocated with the DASC.) The rear area FSC must therefore have the capability to communicate on the senior GCE fire support coordination net, and the air liaison officer must be able to communicate on the tactical air request net. This gives the rear area FSC redundancy in communication and the ability to access any fire support asset available to the MAGTF.

Primary RAS communication will be on the CSS security net which will be monitored by the RAOC and all units/facilities in the MAGTF rear area. (See paragraph 4005, Communications, in FMFM 4-1, *Combat Service Support Operations*, for a discussion of communications nets available to the CSSE.)

## Chapter 6

# Support Considerations

### 6001. Host Nation Support

a. When the MAGTF is operating within the confines of a friendly foreign nation, the sovereignty of the host nation must be fully respected in all aspects of providing security for the rear area. All existing agreements, treaties, and rules of engagement must be strictly adhered to. The RAS effort must be fully coordinated with civil authorities and/or local territorial commanders. Once territory has been secured and occupied, regular military/police forces of the host nation should be incorporated into the RAS effort to the maximum extent possible. Every effort must be made to restore normal conditions in occupied areas to include resumption of employment and spiritual activities by the civilian population. The judicious handling of the civilian population should facilitate the RAS effort as well as make resources of the occupied area available for use. In all cases, military plans and contingencies must be coordinated with and complement those developed by host nation civil authorities.

b. Host nation support is defined as civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, times of crisis/emergencies, or war based upon agreements mutually concluded between nations (Joint Pub 1-02). This applies to forces located on or in transit through the host nation's territory.

c. Host nation support may include, but is not limited to—

- Indirect fire support.
- Traffic/movement control.
- Refugee/civilian population control.
- Engineer support.
- Security of key points (bridges, tunnels, rail facilities, etc.).
- Decontamination assistance.
- Maintenance parts/facilities.
- POL support.
- Road repair/construction.

d. NATO host nation support may include the assignment of a NATO ground combat unit to assist in RAS operations. The NATO host nation would provide area security, to include MSR/LOC security, convoy security, and reaction forces while the local unit/facility commander would still be responsible for point security.

### 6002. Naval Construction Force

a. Naval construction force (NCF) is a generic term applied to that group of deployable naval organizational components which have the common characteristics of possessing the capability to construct, maintain, and/or operate shore, inshore, and/or deep ocean facilities in support of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps (NAVFAC P-315, *Naval Construction Force Manual*).

The mission of the NCF is to provide a responsive, mobile, modern, versatile engineer force to accomplish diverse tasks ranging from timber bunker construction in a forward ground combat environment to construction and/or operation of an advanced industrial facility in support of naval operating forces and the logistics pipeline. The NCF can perform the following specific tasks:

- (1) Provide responsive military construction support to naval, Fleet Marine, and other military forces, including operations, logistics, underwater, ship-to-shore facilities construction, maintenance, and operation.
- (2) Provide military and amphibious assault construction support to naval, Marine, and other forces in military operations.
- (3) Provide subsequent combat service support ashore and defense against overt or clandestine enemy attacks directed towards personnel, camps, and facilities under construction.
- (4) Provide disaster control effort, including assistance to civilian agencies, under conditions of emergency, disaster, or catastrophe caused by enemy action or natural causes.
- (5) Provide forces for civic action employment to complement military, social, and psychological programs of naval and other government agencies.

b. An NCF will be placed under the operational control of the MAGTF commander when the MAGTF is deployed. Normally, a naval construction regiment will support a Marine Expeditionary Force. In support of Marine Corps operations, the NCF's first priority is support of Marine tactical aircraft ashore. Subsequent NCF effort is directed toward the construction and maintenance of roads and bridges, helicopter landing pads/support facilities, upgrading and replacement of assault fuel systems, and construction of ammunition supply points, water facilities, cantonments, defensive structures, logistics airstrips, and other tactical support facilities. Detailed planning and coordination is necessary to ensure NCF capabilities are utilized to their full potential in support of the MAGTF.

c. In addition to its normal construction missions, the NCF can conduct defensive operations when required. It also possesses a formidable array of weapons to include M-16s, M-60 machineguns, .50 caliber machineguns, M-203 grenade launchers, and 81mm mortars. The NCF battalion is organized much like a Marine infantry battalion and includes a fire support coordination capability. The NCF commander will coordinate with the RASC to ensure that NCF assets and capabilities are incorporated into the RAS effort.

# Appendix A

## Rear Air Security SOP Outline

The following outline is included to assist units in developing RAS SOPs.

### 1. SITUATION

- a. General. States the purpose, scope, and basis for the RAS SOP; identifies basic RAS responsibilities and the overall organizational structure for security.
- b. Enemy Forces. Identifies and describes the various types of threats and threat tactics that may be encountered; refers the reader to the most readily available local source of current threat information.
- c. Friendly Forces. Identifies higher, adjacent, and supporting forces that may be involved, with particular attention given to command support and fire support available.
- d. Attachments/Detachments. Identifies the elements which may or may not be involved during normal RAS operations.
- e. Assumptions. Lists those considerations which are likely to have a bearing on RAS requirements but which are not completely supported by facts at the time of writing the SOP.

### 2. MISSION

Discusses the general nature, scope, and levels of protection which the command may be expected to provide for itself in a wide range of situations (what, where, when, and why).

### 3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations. Describes how RAS operations are to be conducted; describes the intended manner in which units would transition from executing primary support missions to performing RAS missions; describes the functions and organization of: the rear area operations center (RAOC), the provisional security forces, and local security forces; describes special security measures such as convoy security, key facility security, etc.; discusses reconnaissance/surveillance requirements; discusses possible GCE involvement in RAS operations.
- b. Tasks. Specifically identifies and describes RAS responsibilities for each of the command's subordinate units, staff sections, and specialized teams; assigns responsibilities for the operation of the RAOC; identifies the tasks which local security/reaction forces must accomplish; assigns the responsibilities for the security of convoys and mobile contact teams; describes damage control requirements and assigns damage control responsibilities; describes RAS-related tasks to be performed by the engineers.

- c. Reserve. Identifies personnel resources for forming reaction forces; describes the employment of reaction forces.
- d. Coordinating Instructions. Defines the various levels of defense conditions; prescribes the extent of unit participation through various operational situations; describes how local security will be integrated/coordinated with the mobile security forces; lists instructions applicable to two or more units.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Prescribes the assignment of RAS-related additional duties to individual members of the command; prescribes RAS-related equipment for individuals/units; identifies other support items that need to be made available.

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Command Relationships. Identifies the commander's responsibility for RAS; describes the chain of command for support elements that would begin functioning only in a higher than normal threat condition.
- b. Signal. Describes the warning system to be used in different threat conditions; focuses on RAS communications and nonroutine intelligence information processing and operations; prescribes those changes to normal operating procedures that will be required as the threat condition changes/develops.
- c. Command Posts. Includes guidance on planning and executing the establishment/displacement of the CP/COC/CSSOC.

#### APPENDIXES:

##### 1. TASK ORGANIZATION

Presents an example of RAS organization for combat including local security and provisional security forces; describes organizational modifications that might be dictated by various threat conditions.

##### 2. INTELLIGENCE

Describes intelligence/counterintelligence activities that are associated with RAS; identifies agencies and resources that may be available to conduct these activities.

##### 3. OPERATIONS

Displays a sample map overlay depicting installation/facility functional areas and the disposition of security forces; describes the organization, functions, and operation of the RAOC and defines the responsibility of personnel assigned thereto.

##### 4. DECEPTION PLANNING

Discusses the employment of deception measures used to enhance RAS.

##### 5. LOGISTICS

Discusses special supporting requirements for the execution of RAS.

##### 6. PERSONNEL

Discusses the requirements for and the assignment of various skilled personnel to RAS operations; addresses use of replacements in a security role.

7. **CIVIL AFFAIRS**  
Focuses on potential security problems and collection opportunities generated by contact with indigenous personnel.
8. **HOST NATION SUPPORT**  
Discusses potential available assets from the host nation.
9. **COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS**  
Defines relationships in various threat situations; includes relationships with host nation security forces; defines on-order execution of RAS tasks.
10. **COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS**  
Lists equipment and describes procedures peculiar to RAS.
11. **OPERATIONS SECURITY**  
Describes measures peculiar to RAS.
12. **AIR OPERATIONS**  
Identifies nature of air support available for RAS.
13. **FIRE SUPPORT**  
Identifies types of fire support available for RAS; describes the responsibilities of the fire support coordinator in the RAOC.
14. **DAMAGE CONTROL**  
Defines damage control measures; identifies available damage control resources; identifies individual/unit damage control training requirements.
15. **CONVOY SECURITY**  
Describes procedures for vehicle escort duties; includes a sample convoy operation order.
16. **SURVEILLANCE AND PATROLLING**  
Discusses general requirements for RAS patrolling and surveillance.
17. **REACTION FORCE**  
Provides instructions on composition, equipment, initial (standby) location, and employment of the mobile security forces.
18. **ENGINEER SUPPORT**  
Describes engineer support available for RAS to include the naval construction force.
19. **EXECUTION CHECKLISTS**  
Focuses on RAS peculiarities in planning requirements.
20. **REPORTS**  
Identifies formats and submission requirements.

# Appendix B

## Rear Area Security Plan

APPENDIX\_\_\_\_(Rear Area Security Plan) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan\_\_\_\_

Ref: (a) (Issuing Headquarters) RAS SOP

Task Organization: Tab A (for RAS, effective on order)

### 1. SITUATION

- a. General. Environment and general situation which would establish probable preconditions for execution of plan.
- b. Enemy Forces. Specific threats to the rear area.
- c. Friendly Forces. Higher, adjacent, and supporting forces with particular attention to command support and fire support agencies; also contains the higher commander's intent.
- d. Attachments/Detachments. Elements under control (or not) of issuing command for participation in the RAS mission.
- e. Assumptions. Those upon which the plan is based (in the absence of facts).

### 2. MISSION

RAS requirements to be accomplished by the command as a whole (what, where, when, and why).

### 3. EXECUTION

- a. Commander's Intent/Concept of Operations. How RAS is to be conducted across the spectrum of anticipated threat capabilities during a particular operation; what organic and outside support capabilities are to be employed in the RAS effort; reference is made to existing RAS SOP.
- b. Tasks. Specific RAS missions for each subordinate element in the task organization; when appropriate, specific deception tasks will be assigned.
- c. Reserve. There is no designated reserve for RAS.
- d. Coordinating Instructions. Instructions applicable to two or more units; control details for the command as a whole; time and conditions under which plan is to be executed.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Those personnel and CSS details that are peculiar to the conduct of RAS (e.g., individual contingency/assignment and special equipment and supplies for provisional units.

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Command Relationships. Includes identity of and instructions concerning the authority and responsibilities of those command support elements activated to assist the MAGTF commander in exercising his RAS command responsibilities.
- b. Signal. References the CEOI and the RAS SOP.
- c. Command Posts. Locations; references the RAS SOP on guidance for rear area CP displacement.

#### TABS:

- A Task Organization
- B Intelligence. Specially oriented on RAS situations; also addresses counterintelligence requirements and measures.
- C Operations. Map overlay information; describes organization and operation of the rear area operations center (RAOC) and elements of the provisional security forces; references the RAS SOP.
- D Deception Plan. Assigns specific tasks designed to deceive and confuse the enemy regarding the location of specific activities.
- E Logistics. Special supporting requirements for RAS execution.
- F Personnel. Primarily addresses assignment of RAS additional duties and the use of available replacements.
- G Civil Affairs. Major interest is focused on the potential security problems and collection opportunities generated by contact with indigenous personnel; references the RAS SOP.
- H Host Nation Support. Addresses potential assets available from the host nation.
- I Command Relationships. Includes indigenous security forces; defines on-order execution of RAS tasks.
- J Communications-Electronics. Equipment and procedures peculiar to the RAS effort; references the RAS SOP.
- K Operations Security. Describes measures peculiar to the RAS effort; references the RAS SOP.
- L Air Operations. Identifies the nature and extent of air support available for RAS; references the RAS SOP.
- M Fire Support. Identifies the requirements for and describes responsibilities of the fire support coordinator in the RAOC; references the RAS SOP.
- N Damage Control. Defines responsibilities; references the RAS SOP.
- O Convoy Security. Specific instructions for vehicle escort duty; references the RAS SOP.

- P Surveillance and Patrolling. Addresses surveillance, patrolling, and early warning in the RAS effort; references the RAS SOP.
- Q Reaction Force. Gives specific instructions for the initial location and employment of the provisional security forces; references the RAS SOP.
- R Engineer Support. Describes the requirements for engineering assistance to include the naval construction force; references the RAS SOP.
- S Execution Checklists. Focuses on RAS peculiarities (transition of personnel to additional duties; formation and employment of provisional units; etc.)
- T Reports. Identifies formats and submission requirements; references the RAS SOP.
- U Distribution.

# Appendix C

## Glossary

### Section I. Acronyms

ABGD .....	air base ground defense	MAW .....	Marine aircraft wing
ACE .....	aviation combat element	MIC .....	mid-intensity conflict
ADC .....	area damage control	MP .....	military police
CAS .....	close air support	MSR .....	main supply route
CEOI .....	communications-electronics operating instructions	MWSS .....	Marine wing support squadron
CIFS .....	close-in fire support	NBC .....	nuclear, biological, and chemical
CP .....	command post	NCF .....	naval construction force
CSS .....	combat service support	NFA .....	no-fire area
CSSE .....	combat service support element	NGF .....	naval gunfire
CSSOC .....	combat service support operations center	OMG .....	operational maneuver group
DASC .....	direct air support center	OP .....	observation post
FDC .....	fire direction center	OPCON .....	operational control
FFA .....	free fire area	PMSP .....	provisional mobile security platoon
FSC .....	fire support coordinator	POL .....	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
FSCC .....	fire support coordination center	POW .....	prisoner of war
FSSG .....	force service support group	RAOC .....	rear area operations center
GCE .....	ground combat element	RAS .....	rear area security
HIC .....	high intensity conflict	RASC .....	rear area security coordinator
LIC .....	low intensity conflict	RFA .....	restrictive fire area
LOC .....	lines of communications	SAC(A) .....	supporting arms coordinator (airborne)
LP .....	listening post	SOP .....	standing operating procedures
MAG .....	Marine aircraft group	TACP .....	tactical air control party
MAGTF .....	Marine Air-Ground Task Force	TSO .....	tactical security officer

## Section II. Definitions

### A

**air base ground defense.** Local security measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify and reduce the effectiveness of enemy ground attack directed against air bases and installations.

**air defense.** All defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in the Earth's envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**air liaison officer.** An officer (aviator/pilot) attached to a ground unit who functions as the primary advisor to the ground commander on air operation matters. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**area damage control.** Measures taken before, during, or after hostile action or natural or man-made disasters, to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**area of responsibility.** 1. A defined area of land in which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area for the development and maintenance of installations, control of movement, and the conduct of tactical operations involving troops under his control along with parallel authority to exercise these functions. 2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**assembly area.** An area in which a command is assembled preparatory to further action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**avenue of approach.** An air or ground route of attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**aviation combat element.** One of the four elements of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force which is task-organized to provide all or a portion of the functions of Marine aviation.

### B

**base.** 1. A locality from which operations are projected or supported. 2. An area or locality containing installations which provide logistic or other support. (Joint Pub 1-02)

### C

**close air support.** Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**close-in fire support.** Air action unique to attack helicopters against hostile targets which are normally in closer proximity to friendly forces.

**combat service support element.** One of the four elements of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force which is task-organized to provide the full range of combat service support necessary to accomplish the MAGTF mission.

**combat service support operations center.** The agency which controls and coordinates the day-to-day operations of the combat service support organization.

**coordinating authority.** A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but

does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. (Joint Pub 1-02)

## D

**delegation of authority.** The action by which a commander assigns part of his authority commensurate with the assigned task to a subordinate commander. While ultimate responsibility cannot be relinquished, delegation of authority carries with it the imposition of a measure of responsibility. The extent of the authority delegated must be clearly stated. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**direct air support center.** A subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system designed for control and direction of close air support and other tactical air support operations, and normally collocated with fire support coordination elements.

**drop zone.** A specific area upon which airborne troops, equipment, or supplies are airdropped. (Joint Pub 1-02)

## F

**fire support coordination.** The planning and executing of fire so that targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**fire support coordination center.** A single location in which are centralized communications facilities and personnel incident to the coordination of all forms of fire support.

**forward air controller.** An officer (aviator/pilot) member of the tactical air control party who, from a forward ground or airborne position, controls aircraft in close air support of ground troops. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**forward edge of the battle area.** The foremost limits of a series of areas in which ground combat units are deployed, excluding the areas in which the covering or screening forces are operating,

designated to coordinate fire support, the positioning of forces, or the maneuver of units. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**free fire area.** A specifically designated area into which any weapons system may be fired without any additional coordination.

## G

**ground combat element.** One of the four elements of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force organized to conduct ground combat operations.

## H

**high intensity conflict.** The relatively unconstrained use of power by one or more nations to gain or protect territory and interests which directly affect the survival of the nation. This form of conflict is characterized by extreme levels of violence. The employment of the full range of military force sustained by the preponderance of other national resources to achieve military and political victory is the primary use of nuclear weapons and may include some or all of the characteristics of low and mid-intensity conflict. (FMFRP 0-14)

**host nation support.** Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, times of crisis/emergencies, or war based upon agreements mutually concluded between nations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

## K

**key terrain.** Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant. (Joint Pub 1-02)

## L

**landing zone.** Any specified zone used for the landing of aircraft. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**lines of communications.** All the routes, land, water, and air, which connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**low intensity conflict.** Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. **Low intensity conflict** ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. **Low intensity conflicts** are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. Also called **LIC**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

## M

**MAGTF rear area.** That area extending rearward from the rear boundary of the ground combat element to the MAGTF rear boundary.

**main supply route.** The route or routes designated within an area of operations upon which the bulk of traffic flows in support of military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Marine aircraft group.** The Marine aircraft group is usually administratively and tactically structured by aircraft category as being either a helicopter group or a fixed-wing group. Composite Marine air groups may also be formed for specific missions or unique organizational/geographic considerations. Each Marine aircraft group has a headquarters and maintenance squadron. With a source of supply, the Marine aircraft group is the smallest aviation unit capable of self-sustaining independent operations. (FMFRP 0-14)

**Marine aircraft wing.** The Marine aircraft wing is the highest level aviation command in the Fleet Marine Force. Each wing is capable of supporting one Marine division. The Marine aircraft wing is task-organized to provide a flexible and balanced air combat organization capable of providing the full range of combat air operations in a variety of areas without the requirement of prepositioned support, control, and logistics facilities. Only the wing has the inherent capability of performing all six aviation functions. (FMFRP 0-14)

**Marine Air-Ground Task Force.** A task organization of Marine forces (division, aircraft wing, and

service support groups) under a single command and structured to accomplish a specific mission. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force components will normally include command, ground combat, aviation combat, and combat service support elements (including Navy support elements). Three types of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces which can be task-organized are the Marine Expeditionary Unit, Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and Marine Expeditionary Force. (FMFRP 0-14)

**mid-intensity conflict.** The limited use of power by nations or organizations in order to gain or protect territory and interests. This intensity of conflict does not include the use of nuclear weapons but may include the use of chemical and biological weapons. It is characterized by the protracted employment of regular armed forces in combat as a major manifestation of power by the threat and responding nations and the designation of military objectives to achieve political and economic goals. It may include some or all of the characteristics of low intensity conflict. (FMFRP 0-14)

## N

**naval construction force.** The combined construction units of the Navy, including primarily the mobile construction battalions and the amphibious construction battalions. These units are part of the operating forces and represent the Navy's capability for advanced base construction. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**no-fire area.** A designated area into which neither fires nor effects of fires will occur. Two exceptions occur: (a) the establishing headquarters asks for or approves fire or (b) an enemy force takes refuge in the area, posing a major threat, and there is insufficient time to clear the fires needed to defend the friendly force. (FMFRP 0-14)

## O

**observation post.** A position from which military observations are made, or fire directed and adjusted, and which possesses appropriate communications; may be airborne. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operational control.** Transferable command authority which may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in Combatant Command (command authority) and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the Service component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called **OPCON**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operational security.** The process of denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations and other activities.

## P

**provisional helicopterborne security company.** A unit of the provisional security forces which provides the rear area security coordinator a highly mobile reaction force capable of performing rear area security missions over extended distances.

**provisional mobile security platoon.** A unit of the provisional security forces which provides the rear area security coordinator with a quick reaction capability in support of the RAS mission.

**provisional security forces.** Units available to the rear area security coordinator for supplementing local defense efforts and to give assistance to the military police in the performance of RAS missions.

## R

**rear area operations center.** The agency responsible for planning, coordinating, directing, and monitoring rear area security. The RAOC is supervised by the tactical security officer.

**rear area security.** The measures taken prior to, during, and/or after an enemy airborne attack, sabotage action, infiltration, guerrilla action, and/or initiation of psychological or propaganda warfare to minimize the effects thereof.

**rear area security coordinator.** That person responsible for planning, coordinating, and directing the RAS effort. The RASC is usually the CSSE commander but can be the ACE commander.

**restrictive fire area.** An area in which specific restrictions are imposed and into which fires that would exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters. The purpose of the restrictive fire area is to regulate fires into an area according to the stated restrictions. (FMFRP 0-14)

## S

**spectrum of conflict.** A term which encompasses the full range of warfare; cold, limited, and general war.

## T

**tactical air control party.** A subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system designed to provide air liaison to land forces and for the control of aircraft. (Joint Pub 1-02) In the Marine Corps, tactical air control parties are organic to infantry divisions, regiments, and battalions. Tactical air control parties establish and maintain facilities for liaison and communications between parent units and airspace control agencies, inform and advise the ground unit commander on the employment of supporting aircraft, and request and control air support. (FMFRP 0-14)

**tactical security officer.** The officer responsible for the functioning of the rear area operations center.

**target of opportunity.** A target visible to a surface or air sensor or observer, which is within range of available weapons and against which fire has not been scheduled or requested. (Joint Pub 1-02)

# Appendix D

## References

### Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication

Joint Pub 1-02                    DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (1 December 1989)

### Fleet Marine Force Manuals

FMFM 3-5                    Employment of Military Police in Combat (under development as OH 3-5)  
FMFM 3-21                    MAGTF Intelligence Operations (under development)  
FMFM 4-1                    Combat Service Support Operations (under development as OH 4-1)  
FMFM 5-4A                    Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support  
FMFM 5-5                    Antiair Warfare  
FMFM 6-1                    Ground Combat Operations (under development as OH 6-1)  
FMFM 6-18                    Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination (under development)

### Fleet Marine Force Reference Publications

FMFRP 5-54                    Small Arms Defense Against Air Attack

### Operational Handbooks

OH 3-5                    Employment of Military Police in Combat  
OH 4-1                    Combat Service Support Operations  
OH 5-5                    Antiair Warfare  
OH 6-1                    Ground Combat Operations

### U.S. Army Publications

FM 90-14                    Rear Battle  
Army TC 90-14                    Rear Security Operations  
TRADOC Pam 525-30                    U.S. Army Operational Concept for Rear Area Protection

### U.S. Navy Publication

NAVFAC P-315                    Naval Construction Force Manual